Wagering the Waterfront? Angling the abc & xyz of Quayside Toronto

 Looking over docklands on a hot summer day - the view here is amazing (Carr, 2017).

It’s been almost a year now since Waterfront Toronto announced that Sidewalk Labs – a subsidiary of Alphabet Inc. (formerly known as Google) – won the international competition to develop Quayside, a derelict piece of land located at the bottom of Parliament Street, wedged between Lake Ontario and the Gardiner Expressway. A media storm ensued around the world(1), announcing that Google was getting into urban development, and rightly so. After all, why would a company that runs an annual revenue of roughly 110 billion (Alphabet, 2017: 5) based on advertising (Fuchs 2017; Glowik, 2017), or as Bilić (2018) called it “algorithm capitalism”, get into urban development? Or more urgently: In what ways does this challenge other modes of urban development?

What is all the hype about?

It is perhaps not surprising that many are waiting with baited breath in anticipation over what it is that Sidewalk Labs will, in fact, build. So far, Sidewalk Labs maintains that, in partnership with Waterfront Toronto, it will develop Quayside into the best smart city ever, learning from past urban planning projects, and building improvements into the design. This joint effort is called Sidewalk Toronto (not to be confused with Sidewalk Talk)(2). Quayside will be environmental with climate positive passive buildings, which will be flexible and multi-purpose. The garbage will also be automatically removed, smart cars will efficiently ferry people about, and sensors will monitor air pollution and traffic. Quayside will also be social: Development will be participatory and harnessing diverse inputs. To this end, Sidewalk Labs has already engaged a series of Public Roundtables, Public Talks, Neighbourhood Meetings, Workshops, Design Jams, Civic Labs, Kids Camps, and more in what is termed interacting with the neighbourhood (Aggarwala, 2018). Housing will also be affordable and residents will profit from a system that integrates health services.

With the aid of the celebrated “single unified platform” Quayside will also help the government be more efficient (reducing the costs of government and the amount of taxes that each citizen will have to pay), providing data about crowd control, issuing per-click governmental permissions, and generally easing bureaucratic processes that are traditionally scattered across different public institutions in different, often incompatible, data formats (Sidewalk Labs, 2018). Best of all, this digital district that will be “private by design,” (Sidewalk Labs, 2017), drawing upon a “developed in Canada” philosophy of privacy developed by the renowned Professor Ann Cavoukian at Ryerson University.

See Sidewalktoronto.ca for a trove of information about development at Quayside, including interviews, videos, calendar of upcoming activities, reviews of past events, press releases, and image galleries. Browse through the appendices of their Feedback Reports or lists of English language media coverage.

In short: Sidewalk Labs assures us that Quayside is going to be amazing. The question is only: How amazing and for who?

This may all look exciting, but there are many unanswered questions

Sidewalktoronto is definitely a departure from business as usual developer-led urbanization in the city. If its commitment to state-of-the-art design doesn’t ring out remarkable, then its apparent readiness to interact with Torontonians ought to strike a new chord. However, there are many unanswered questions, and we are certainly not the first to notice the gaps in information (see John Lorinc's work at spacing.ca). As urban scholars, we very much appreciate these concerns, and are interested in following Quayside because it has the potential to be a game changer in how we understand the political economic production of cities. There are many uncertainties associated with Quayside, in particular, and digital cities in general. While the digitalization of urban spaces (broadly conceived) can potentially offer benefits, a number of unresolved or emerging challenges are easily identifiable, especially in respect to the over reliance on tech companies and their products, reliability of data production and corporatized data infrastructure, and not least urban governance, data ownership, and data sovereignty.

It is well-documented that smart cities have been heavily pushed by tech companies who view digitizing urban environments as a burgeoning market for their products (Kitchin 2015). Kitchin (ibid.) notes that this possibly comes along with a number of undesirable externalities: a) the commodification of public services, as city services are administered for the benefit of private profit; b) technological lock-in effects that can be not only be difficult to reverse, but may also render the city less resilient as it fights bugs, viruses, crashes, and hacks; and, (c) digitalization endorses processes of standardization that overlook specificities of place (a case of policy mobility, actually! see Carr, 2013), and fixes municipal administrations to narrowly defined technocratic modes of digital governance.

Others observe that there is a need to understand the epistemologies behind the production of big data, algorithms, digital technology design, (Ash et al., 2016): Data is not value-free (Kitchin 2015). Rather, they are indicative of end processes of political ideologies (e.g. neoliberal urban agendas), and the associated methods and processes of framing that structure the production of data. One might search out, for example, how algorithms are informed by and then reproduce socio-economic inequalities, or how far the resulting corporatization of city services resemble technological solutionism (Ash et al., 2016). Ash et al., (2016) refer to the work of Graham and Shelton (2013) who identified data shadows, “where groups who are considered valuable are increasingly data mined, while other populations are excluded from analysis,” (Ash et al. 2016: 34).

Circulation of data around the globe has always sparked debate about who owns and regulates data stored, processed in remote geographic locations (De Filippi and McCarthy 2012). Increasingly, too, scholars are wondering about the implications of data-driven markets, algorithmic capitalism, and algorithmic governance (Bilić, 2018; Fuchs, 2017; Larsson, 2018). There is thus, 

“the need to examine the ownership and control of data; the integration of data within urban operating systems, control rooms, and data markets; data security and integrity; data protection and privacy, data quality and provenance and dataveillance.” (Ash et al., 2016: 37).

On this level, one might find inspiration from projects like NetHood or MAZI that aim to  democratise data collection by promoting technological literacy and seeking out ways that data generation/collection can be performed by and for neighbourhood communities.

In any case, these are all extensive debates – and they are hardly only relevant debates(!) – that are unfolding across various fields of social science, which ought to be considered before or alongside developments at Quayside. This entry of Urbanization Unbound will start simple, and unpack some of the links between Alphabet, Google and Sidewalk, and who/what is promoting the activities at Quayside.

An interesting encounter of the … kind?

The above Twitter dialogue was a series of responses that Sidewalk Labs had to a question of mine concerning their observations of the St. Lawrence Neighbourhood (SLN). Back in July, Sidewalk Labs circulated an article expounding on SLN’s uniqueness. Knowing the area well, I tweeted,

“Very nice article on the St. Lawrence Neighbourhood (where I grew up). It took imagination to build that neighbourhood & courage to try non-market modes of land use. @sidewalklabs How does this square this with Google-owned Quayside?” 

And, minutes later, Sidewalk Labs responded, outlining some development intentions and correcting me on its business structure. As an urban geographer that has focussed on other issues of developer-led urban transformation, it hadn’t been high on my priority list to examine the precise structure of Alphabet Inc. But, okay, the oversight was indeed mine.

So, Sidewalk Labs was correct in reminding me that they are not Google: They are a sister firm of Google LLC, umbrellaed by Alphabet Inc. And, Rohit Aggarwala, Head of Urban Systems at Sidewalktoronto, was also not incorrect in insisting that Sidewalk is not a tech company (even if it seems overstated, and a bit like a backlash to the sceptical press),

“I want to reiterate: We are not a tech company!! We’re different. We combine that belief that cities are a combination of, yes, a set of technologies and a place in geography, but a community of people,” (Aggarwala, 2018).

In his view, it was essential to understand that when Waterfront Toronto put out its call for proposals, it was out of the plain love of city building that Sidewalk responded (Aggarwala, 2018).

The conglomerate in the background

Still, let’s back up and clear some things up with a bit of cursory research. Back in 2015, Google Inc. announced that the company would be structured such that the incorporated Google would be transformed into a limited liability company and become a subsidiary of a newly created public holding company. Headquartered in Mountain View, California, Alphabet Inc. (3), became the new parent company of Google LLC and a myriad of further subsidiaries – sister companies to Google LLC, that is. There are many illustrations across the net that attempt to explain the structure – It is hard to be sure, however, which ones are well researched, accurate, complete, and up-to-date. Financially, Alphabet Inc. is divided into two "segments,"

“[Alphabet’s] segments include Google and Other Bets. The Google segment includes its Internet products, such as Search, Ads, Commerce, Maps, YouTube, Google Cloud, Android, Chrome and Google Play, as well as its hardware initiatives. The Google segment is engaged in advertising, sales of digital content, applications and cloud offerings, and sales of hardware products. The Other Bets segment is engaged in the sales of Internet and television services through Google Fiber, sales of Nest products and services, and licensing and research and development (R&D) services through Verily,” (Reuters, 2018a).

Listed as GOOGL (Class A, one vote each) or GOOG (Class C, no voting rights) on the NASDAQ(4), stock values have nearly doubled since the day that Alphabet Inc. was founded, October 2, 2015. In the second quarter of 2018, Alphabet announced 32.657 billion US Dollars in revenue, 32.512 billion of which was generated by the larger of its two segments, Google (Alphabet 2018: 2-3). It’s fair to say that revenues from Alphabet’s Google segment constitute a large portion of Alphabet's earnings – like 99.5559%. Rounding it up to 100%, however, would occlude the remaining 145 million $US generated by Alphabet Inc.’s smaller segment that is aptly named, Other Bets. Companies listed in this portfolio include the Google X moonshot factory projects, Verily (healthcare, smart contact lenses, glitter-sized biomarkers), Calico (biotech, curing aging), GV (a venture capital fund), Chronicle (cybersecurity), DeepMind (AI development), Waymo (self-driving cars), Access (internet provider), Loon (internet balloons), Wing (delivery drones) (5), and Sidewalk Labs and Sidewalk Talk (based in NYC), and Sidewalk Toronto (6). 

In investor circles, stocks in Alphabet Inc. are among the most closely watched. Small wonder, given that the return on investments have been on the scale of 25-30% per year, a yield that could dwarf the appreciation of single pieces of property – even those in downtown Toronto (7). And while bullish returns have delighted investors, some note that Google’s – ehm Alphabet’s – returns are not as strong as others from the so called FAANG group (Facebook, Amazon, Apple Netflix, Google). These investors wager that Alphabet Inc. is playing the long game trading off short term gain for possible longer term returns associated with these… other bets.

So, it seems that Sidewalk Labs is, in the first instance, one of Alphabet’s gambles. And by extension, the ca.100 strong labour force working there are in charge of upping their odds and maximizing their winnings. In an of itself, this is nothing new in market-led development, of course. It does raise the question of what Waterfront Toronto and Torontonians – the necessary partners (Aggarwala, 2018) – stand to gain. It is even less clear how some of the issues will be dealt with, such as algorithmic governance and corporatised public services that have been identified in scholarly circles (see above and reference list below). We will try to dive deeper into some of these topics in later entries.

Constance Carr 

This article is also available as a pdf here.

Acknowledgments

Thanks, Markus, for reading and pushing me on this.

More related links
Hesse, M. and Carr, C. (2018) The Corporate City Looming Part II: The “smart” City competes
Carr, C., and Hesse, M. (2017) The corporate city looming? Part I
Carr, C. (2017) Hipsterland in Toronto's East Downtown
Carr, C. (2017) Digital Cities - Toronto trying to get ahead
Carr, C. (2014) Co-op living in downtown Toronto - Some notes on housing (Part II)

Notes

1. In a previous post, we listed some of those articles, including German sources. However, if you want an exhaustive list of articles, look no further Sidewalk Labs has already compiled them at their website.
2. @Sidewalklabs, if you are reading along, please feel free to leave a correction in the comments below!!
3. This page has easter eggs too!! Tell me if you find them.
4. Does anyone know what GOOGL.O is?
5. Some of these have since become independent companies listed in Other Bets (Reuters, 2018b)
6. Can anyone confirm that Sidewalk Labs is part of the Moonshot Factory?
7. August and Walks (2018:131) calculated that TransGlobe accrued a 60% return after two years. And, while winnings are in the order of millions (not billions), such practices of financialization already cause problems with respect to housing affordability in the city.

References

Alphabet Inc. (2017) Alphabet Announces Fourth Quarter and Fiscal Year 2017 Results https://abc.xyz/investor/pdf/2017Q4_alphabet_earnings_release.pdf (Accessed August 6, 2018)

Alphabet Inc. (2018) Alphabet Announces Second Quarter 2018 Results https://abc.xyz/investor/pdf/2018Q2_alphabet_earnings_release.pdf (Accessed August 6, 2018)

Alphabet Inc. (2018) Q2 2018 Earnings Call webcast, Transcript https://abc.xyz/investor/pdf/2018_Q2_Earnings_Transcript.pdf (Accessed August 6, 2018)

Aggarwala, R. (2018) Public Roundtable #1. Sidewalk Toronto. https://sidewalktoronto.ca/event/public-roundtable-1/ (Accessed August 6, 2018)

Ash, J., Kitchin, R., Leszczynski (2016) Digital turn, digital geographies? Progress in Human Geography, 42(1) 25-43.

August, M. and Walks (2018) Gentrification, suburban decline, and the financialization of multi-family rental housing: The case of Toronto. Geoforum, 89,124-136.
Bilić, P. (2018) A Critique of the Political Economy of Algorithms: A Brief History of Google’s Technological Rationality. tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique 16(1) 315-331.

Carr (2014) Discourse Yes, Implementation Maybe: An Immobility and Paralysis of Sustainable Development Policy, European Planning Studies 22(9) 1824-1840.

Fuchs, C. (2017). Social Media: A Critical Introduction, 2nd Edition. Los Angeles: Sage

Glowik, M. (2017) Global Strategy in the Service Industries: Dynamics, Analysis, Growth. New York: Routledge.

Graham, M. and Shelton, T. (2013) Geography and the future of big data, big data and the future of geography. Dialogues in Human Geography. 3(3) 255-261.

Kitchin, R. (2015) Making sense of smart cities: addressing present shortcomings. Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 8, 131-136.

De Filippi, P. and McCarthy, S. (2012). Cloud Computing: Centralization and Data Sovereignty. European Journal of Law and Technology, 3(2)

Larsson, S. (2018) Algorithmic governance and the need for consumer empowerment in data-driven markets. Internet Policy Review: Journal of internet regulation. 7(2), 1-13.

Reuters (2018a) Profile: Alphabet Inc (GOOGL.O) https://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/company-profile/GOOGL.O

Reuters (2018b) Alphabet to make Loon, Wing projects independent companies
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-alphabet-projects/alphabet-to-make-loon-wing-projects-independent-companies-idUSKBN1K128R (Accessed August 7, 2018)

Sidewalk Labs (2017) Our Approach To Data Privacy. https://sidewalktoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Sidewalk-Labs-Approach-to-Privacy.pdf (Accessed August 6, 2018).

Sidewalk Labs (2018) Meet Sidewalk Toronto: Kristina and Craig Talk Open Urban Data https://youtu.be/LKN_EHkjCcs (Accessed August 7, 2018)

Autonomy and Universality – Some notes on the liaison between university and society

The German philosopher and cultural theorist Jürgen Mittelstraß has become quite famous for his works on the sociology and science of knowledge. In fact, his metaphor of the ‘houses of knowledge’, once used as the title of an edited volume on selected writings (1), might well have provided some inspiration in the naming of the University of Luxembourg’s main building, the Maison du Savoir. Mittelstraß, an academic who is particularly interested in the constitution, generation, and dissemination of scientific knowledge, is also a frequent writer about the role of the university in today’s society. This was also the case with an essay published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) on 23rdJuly 2018, in which the relationship between university and its society was emphasised again.(2)

Snap shot of the FAZ, July 23, 2018

In this essay, Mittelstraß reflected upon the role of the university in a society that can be largely understood as a society of knowledge (German: “Wissensgesellschaft”), based on a scientific and technological rationale. The author signified this type of society as a ‘Leonardo’ world (of course named after Leonardo da Vinci) – a world that is artificial and increasingly constituted by science and technology. In this particular context, research that brings about science and technology can no longer be approached and understood as something entirely separate from society; rather, that science and technology fundamentally shape the latter. This is a well-established viewpoint, of course. Effectively, this point illustrates not only the strong interdependencies between the two, but also points at the societal responsibilities which the system of knowledge creation has.

The main question that Mittelstaß addressed was whether or not there is still any idea of what a university could be about, which pays justice to both: the part that generates knowledge and the rest of society in which it is embedded. While it seems increasingly popular to assume that borders between research and practice, science and society / policy are about to vanish (and this would be good), in his essay Mittelstraß looks back at emerging normative imperatives, as a consequence of the scientification of society and, in parallel, a sort of secularisation of science. These imperatives were, according to the author: a politisation in the wake of the post-1967/68 events; a didactification of science in the 1970s and afterwards; the rather economistic claims for usability and transfer of scientific knowledge that gained momentum in the 1990s/2000s and prevail today; and most recently, the demand that the university promote and support sustainable development (or transformative research). There is also no doubt that the author is well aware of the fact that the sciences are not only part of any solution, but have also produced a number of problems. However, Mittelstraß is extremely sceptical of this latest development – not because he would be against sustainability as a guideline for societal development, but because, for him, this can only be understood as an outcome of forces – both internal and external to the university – that seek to determine the kinds of knowledge that a university ought to produce, of which he is quite critical. 

Mittelstraß sees, indeed, that the university ought to acknowledge, and pro-actively deal with, societal challenges. Being insensitive of these challenges would lead to the loss of any university’s credibility. However, the more that the university is subject to imperatives defined from outside (for whatever good or bad reason), the more that one of the two fundamental constituencies of the university is undermined: autonomy. Autonomy, understood as the ability of the university to steer its own ways of research and teaching, build and develop its own systems of organisation, practice a reflected set of measures for quality control, and remain politically independence. Funding bodies are increasingly claiming for ‘returns on investment’, which probably illustrates the dilemma of the modern university’s loss of autonomy most succinctly. Beyond these structural and political dimensions, Mittelstraß’ main argument is actually that it is precisely the traditional distinctions between fundamental, applied and usable knowledge generation are no longer valid. They were followed by a multitude of different forms of knowledge creation, a continuum of research forms, paradigms and habits all of which emerged as a complex phenomenon within the sciences and academia. This development within the sciences occurred as structurally or theoretically independent from societal ‘demand’ and would have to be, so his main contention, left over to the sciences’ own responsibility.

The second major issue that Mittelstraß emphasised, which is closely linked to the idea of autonomy, is universality. Universality is considered a key and fundamental characteristic of the idea of the university. Apart from the overarching tendency of specialisation, scientific knowledge would still grow best on the grounds of a field that is tilled by many. Important scientific developments would most probably require the collaboration of various disciplines and sub-disciplinary fields, which can also be read as a plea for fields such as the humanities or social sciences. Of course, boundaries between these fields need to be overcome, in order to allow new scientific knowledge to emerge. According to Mittelstraß, the commitment of the university must be to provide the highest possible degree of universality and a flexible relation between disciplinarity and trans-disciplinarity – making the university theinstitutional place for these different forms of knowledge generation to evolve and intersect. These properties of the university are passionately defended by the author against any form of political steering and determination, and the most recent case of such determination mentioned by him included the idea of the Great Transformation. Despite the popularity of such umbrella concepts for societal change (and the good reasons that are underlying the call for change), the author reserves the authority and significance of knowledge generation in the first place to the university, not to political discourses.

Why refer to Jürgen Mittelstraß here, also given that his position might be considered critical of sustainability and the potential transformative role of the university? It is simply because his reflection upon the autonomy and universality of academic institutions is relevant to ongoing debates (or better, developments) at the University of Luxembourg (UL) as well. These developments are certainly not unique to the UL, as they unfold against the background of comparable events in a range of European countries, such as Germany, the Netherlands or the UK.(3) However, as is the case of our young university in a small country, proximity to the political realm is much higher here, and related changes have obviously occurred much faster than anywhere else.(4) It is rather likely that changes can reach a critical state that challenges both the university’s autonomy and universality. Even the (small) debate about the Grand Duchy’s new university law, revealed by the National Chamber in June 2018, has not necessarily changed the picture. There are at least two reasons for this. Firstly, a university’s autonomy not only depends on external relationships, most importantly the conditions under which funding is ensured, but its autonomy also reflects the rules and regulations of its internal constitution and management. In this respect, an important question remains about the framework conditions under which the UL and its subunits will be able to exist in the future as sovereign academic bodies that can decide independently on their work, research foci and the like – certainly assuming that they are part of a bigger picture of the institution as a whole and refrain from behaving irrespective of it. Secondly, it looks as if ‘expectation management’ is the new approach rising in the political realm concerning what the UL is researching and teaching, and in how far the government’s major political focus areas (which are not necessarily equivalent to the country’s needs) should be respected in the university’s future research and teaching activities.

There are no short and easy answers out of these dilemmas mentioned here. For sure, one can well imagine that past claims for transparency and collaborative practice in the internal organisation of the UL will come to fruition in the foreseeable future. One needs to be optimistic in this respect. The same applies to disciplinary variety, which is usually subject to internal decision-making of academia. Given my background in the humanities and social sciences in general, and geography and planning in particular, it is rather unfortunate that the imperative of competitiveness by specialisation and the related definition of target areas (lighthouses, clusters, priorities) have become hegemonic in higher education policy recently, in the Grand Duchy as elsewhere. The implementation of such principles – which were, in fact, derived from economics and business management – has created disciplinary monotony, rather than originality. And, sufficient proof is still lacking that the outcomes of these strategies will generate more preeminent science than other paradigms, methods and disciplinary practices. This of course needs critical reflection.

As regards the external relationships that an academic institution is embedded in, most relevant could be the fostering of collective learning processes between scientists and practitioners that emphasise the particularities and peculiarities under which the work of either side is organised and practiced – which would be for the mutual benefit of all participants. This could include a more detailed exploration of the interface between science and practice, or science and policy, which might also reveal more about the kinds of framework conditions something called ‘impact’ could be achieved, which is always so elegantly spoken about but only ever loosely defined.(5) Such learning processes would require interest in, if not curiosity of, the others’ life-worlds and practices. In the case of the UL, this might also contribute to ensuring what Jürgen Mittelstraß noted as the fundamentals of scientific work in the first place: autonomy and universality.

Markus Hesse

Index

1) Jürgen Mittelstraß (1998), Häuser des Wissens. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

2) Jürgen Mittelstraß (2018), Die Wissenschaft und ihre Gesellschaft. F.A.Z. issue no. 168, 23.07.2018, p. 6.

3) Stefano Collini (2012), What are Universities for?London: Penguin; Stefano Collini (2017): Speaking of Universities. London: Verso.

4) Markus Hesse (2017), Widersprüchlich, ungeduldig, selbstbezogen? Anmerkungen zum Verhältnis Luxemburgs zu seiner Universität. forum376, p. 14-16.

5) Andrew Harding (2014), What is the difference between an impact and an outcome? Impact is the longer term effect of an outcome.Retrieved from the Web on 24 July 2018, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2014/10/27/impact-vs-outcome-harding/

Critical Mass Luxembourg

Over a lunch discussion today, it came to light that not everyone knows what a Critical Mass demo is. Well, there is a chance to find out because, in Luxembourg,

"Dei nächst ass den 27/7 um 18h bei der Gëlle Fra."

Critical Mass cyclist demos have been around since the early 90's and first began in the hilly city of San Francisco. Since then it has spread to over 300 cities world wide, becoming an effective means of generating awareness of urban mobility issues. Traditionally, cyclists meet on the last Friday of the month at 6 pm, and then just cycle about together. They are usually peaceful and family friendly events.  Sometimes even the police on bicycles join in. ....but uh... Not always: It is wise to know your legal rights, and the rules of the road (and teach these to minors). But there's not much to it, and can be a surprising means to discover what a car-free city could look and sound (!) like.

A simple search for Critical Mass cycle demos on google scholar will reveal plenty of documentation. There is also a tonne of footage of Critical Masses over the years in different cities, available on youtube. Here is a small sampling: New York in 2016, Toronto in 2010, London in 2015, Hamburg 2018.

Thank you, Trent!

Thank you to Trent Carr (my brother and guitarist of the Canadian post-grunge band, the Headstones) for always being ready to deal with photoshop issues for this blog at at the drop of the hat, at lightening speed, and for free (!).

With eleven albums (two gold and one platinum), @theheadstones are listed as one of Canada's top 100 bands of all time.  After an 8-year break, they came back full swing with several crowd-funded studio albums. And, last fall they completed a sold-out cross-Canada tour. I must say, it's always shocking to me to return to Canada and see audiences of 5000+ in the mosh pit, trails of groupies, and regular radio play.

Check them out on youtube.  

Buy their records at iTunes and some swag at their website

Trent is also a photographer and painter.  He even has some paintings of Luxembourg!

Combien ça coûte? – Some concluding notes on land, money, property & profit (Part II)

In Part I of this entry on the interrelated news items addressing the Luxembourg real estate market last month, four different vignettes were presented that indicated the extent to which urban development in the capital city is more and more driven by external if not global actors, money, and interests. The news items were a response of sorts to that phenomenon and in their entirety, they illustrated how land is becoming a key commodity across development circuits. In conclusion, the overarching question now is: What do these different narratives tell us about Luxembourg and the Greater Region? Or, breaking the question down further still: 1) What sort of city are we dealing with here? 2) What are the local implications of global urbanisation processes? 3) How does or should policy and planning deal with the related challenges?

1 Firstly, one of the fundamental consequences of reflecting on these issues is that one has to accept the fact that the character of the capital city is something utterly specific: This is not a usual city! A place that administers billions of Euros is hardly an ordinary city. It is hardly just another place housing circa 140,000 people networked in a local sphere of mutual interdependences, the so-called Agglo-Lux. Its political role as the capital of a small country, which is globally connected and regionally situated close to borders, renders it more of a proto-type “city-state formation”. It has more in common with the small, but rapidly growing, desert capitals such as Doha, Qatar, or Dubai, UAE, than it does to neighbouring cities of comparable size such as Metz, France, or Trier, Germany. In terms of governance, this city-state formation was lucky enough to make the “most of smallness”(1), by offering a variety of innovation policies, a business-friendly climate and short distances to decision-makers. Here, making a fortune out of smallness means pursuing economic niche strategies that can be set in place primarily thanks to political sovereignty.

The secret to the success of such places is the consequence of multiple factors. Among these, historical path dependence and path creativity play a role, but so does the successful insertion into services value chains, particularly the attraction of financial industries, and increasingly digital processes, products and infrastructures. These assets are not necessarily developed based on the principle of agglomeration, but it looks as if relationality is key to the ability of smaller places to get on the radar of global players and money flows.(2) Relationality means that powerful actors at state and local levels – both entrepreneurs and the agents of the entrepreneurial state – are able to connect to the rest of the world, attract investments, and trigger subsequent paths of development. These might sometimes be difficult to plan for: They initially happened more or less accidentally. However, they were then understood as an opportunities whose potentials were later fostered. Thus, they contributed to the making of a small hotspot in big global business.

It seems contradictory that cities can be small but global. However, some of these small places, as the ones named above, have developed rather rapidly, revealing an astonishing pace of, and openness to, change. This is the more general, not Luxembourg-specific, dimension of the issue. Of course, globalization provided a major pre-condition for globalized city-state formations to emerge. However, things have changed recently, particularly since Trump and Brexit. For some reason, open markets and globalization politics and rhetoric are increasingly questioned. The imperative of globalization seems less powerful than it once was, for good or bad reason. Also, the asymmetries between urban size and function (or power) as deployed by these smaller cities are more than obvious. So there is good reason to overcome the rhetoric of global cities that consistently addresses the usual-suspects, and focus more on highly specialized minor capitals such as financial market places, tax havens, logistics hubs, and the like. The related dynamics create places that are different from our usual imagination of what a city tends to be. They are extraordinary in certain ways – even though Peter J. Taylor once stated that judging from his perspective, all cities are somehow extraordinary.(3) The least that one could say is that many of these places are truly exceptional. Or, can you find any other city where almost every corner is reachable by bike, while at the same time, globalization provides a local airport that offers seven or eight regular flights to London, UK, per workday? Not very many, probably. It’s time to seriously acknowledge these specificities of the place, before getting closer to ‘solutions’.

2 Secondly, if we understand the globally embedded capital city as a relational construct, thus going beyond usual stereotypes of urban places and their spatial fixes (urban design, public space, ‘cities for the people’) – what then are the local ramifications of this phenomenon? In a previous blog post on mobility issues mostly related to the site of the new Campus Belval, some of the causal mechanisms that drive the country’s spatial development were already mentioned. Following these considerations, Luxembourg’s business model is conceived of as being geographical by nature, where the small country is, firstly, surrounded by larger neighbours that provide the labour pool for its expanding economy. Secondly, the increasing connections established to the global economy lead to a spatial imprint of the small country that is much larger than its surface area of 2,500+ km2 may indicate.

The associated impact of the globalized place on physical space, infrastructure systems, and arteries that ensure the seamless flows of all the items that keep the country’s economy going is massive. It’s a trivial (not banal) truth that the enabling systems for operating a top services and financial industry location are necessarily material: One needs educated staff, land for buildings and offices, accessibility etc. Housing is certainly included here as well, and the bitter truth is about scarcity in quantitative terms (partly due to the provision of office not housing areas), and qualitative standards that are limiting affordability. Offices, condos, related services for the services class are thus increasingly dominating the built environment of towns and cities. The enormous degree of construction that is observed in some of Luxembourg’s hotspots (the capital city, Belval, and many more projects emerging at smaller scales) is an immediate outcome of the relational profile of the city-state formation called Luxembourg. Likewise, the huge sites that have been developed in the past, such as Plateau Kirchberg, are a good illustration of the spatial needs of the white-collar industry.

Another interesting impact revealed by the cases of the Oberstadt and Etoile, which were part of the first of these two blog notes, evolves from the fact that the city’s financial market and the real estate market are getting closer together, even though they have evolved rather separately. Maybe this is random, maybe it’s an outcome of the increasing financialisation of the urban, maybe it’s simply because the huge amounts of money administered here also seek a secure place to land. For that purpose, the Grand Duchy seems extremely well suited, given its stable political environment and the stunning growth prospects for the near future. Thus, it seems rather likely that big global money will not only continue to pass through for the sake of its multiplication, but that it will also settle in with further investment in bricks and mortar. 

This impact threatens to become even more delicate, since actor constellations in Luxembourg are different from the usual global city, where foreign currency swipes away at local residents and their interests, unfolding as a clear black and white pattern that evokes the contentious meanings of “us” and “them”. Here, the alliance between land and money is more complex, as it is still driven by the autochthone; that is, it is orchestrated by a mélange of local property owners, real estate industries, financing, and political representation of most parties. The divide is not between the global and the local, but probably between the roughly two halves of the society: the one that has land resources and political power, and the other that has to pay an increasing price for realising the mere right to find habitat, while being mostly excluded from political decision-making. So, the higher the pressure gets on the “system,” the more lucrative it tends to be at least for some of the actors involved here. Why should they claim for change?

3 Thirdly, in light of these interpretations, an important question is whether planners and politicians are aware of these changes, and how spatial planning should respond to them. Is planning sensitive to the peculiarities of the economy and the links to the real estate market? Not really. Indeed, spatial planning is still at work in this country, both at state and municipal levels.(4) However, any attempt to keep pace with the pressure and speed of growth and development must be limited. The most striking issue here is that the political economy is absent from local analyses of urban issues and related problems: There is little or nothing heard that addresses the causal relationships between socio-economic and political-economic framework conditions and practices on the one hand, and the obscure ways development is pushed forward on the other hand, particularly by providing more and more office space for the services sector. Land speculation is as absent from urban and planning discourses, just as Luxleaks and Panama Papers were also mostly ignored by general debates some time ago - despite their significance with respect to the country’s efforts in being a trusted place for doing business.

Conceptual approaches for spatial planning are hardly visible. If they exist at all, then they are shifting between the generic and the specific, between domestic and international frames, between high ambition and more formal instruments, and they are without robust orientation. One continues to compare the capital city and/or the country with metro areas such as Brussels, Copenhagen or Paris, and continues to seek and collect “best” practices – as if these could be easily implemented in an entirely different, highly specific environment (as explained above). Irritation at the level of institutionalised planning adds to the problem. It is probably fair to say that the tradition of planning in this country is by and large authoritarian, and that public participation (or better, consultation) arrived on the agenda only recently, in a sort of hasty attempt to compensate for long lasting deficiencies. However, planning is yet understood as a means of defining the one ultimate solution for future development, and not as a method of finding the well considered choice between different alternatives.

The consensual (and thus hegemonic) bottom line is urban design, welfare politics, and the negation of conflict and contradictions. The ‘real’ causes of the problem – i.e. the concurring demands on land use, that reflect different sets of economic resources and political power that target different consumers – are rarely emphasised. Plans and policies should be  negotiated between authorities and civil society etc. Such approaches, understood in strategic and not deal-making (!) terms are still missing here. It is then only consequent to expect that the related problems on real estate and housing markets, which inspired this two-part blog, will remain as pressing as they currently are.

Markus Hesse

Index

1) Thanks again to Adam Grydehøj for providing this wonderful phrase:Grydehøj A. (2011) Making the most of smallness: economic policy in microstates and sub-national island jurisdictions. Space & Polity 15(3), 183-196.

2) For introducing the concept of the relational city, see Sigler, T. J. (2013) Relational cities: Doha, Panama City, and Dubai as 21st century entrepôts. Urban Geography 34(5): 612-633; and Sigler, T. J. (2016) After the ‘world city’ has globalised: Four agendas towards a more nuanced framework for global urban research. Geography Compass 10(9): 389-398. As applied to this country: Hesse, M. (2016) On borrowed size, flawed urbanisation and emerging enclave spaces: The exceptional urbanism of Luxembourg, Luxembourg. In: European Urban & Regional Studies23(4), 612-627.

3) Taylor, P. J. (2013) Extraordinary cities: Millennia of moral syndromes, world-systems and city/state relations. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

4) See the short country report on the state of planning and planning education, Hesse, M. (2015) Luxembourg.In: disP – The Planning Review51(1), 54-55.

Another tale of large-scale urban planning: The quandaries of mobility into and out of Campus Belval

This fall, it will be three years since major components of the University of Luxembourg – most notably the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences (FLSHASE) – have moved (and were moved) to Belval. The following note is a response to on-going debates about the calamities of getting there and back home, and how to improve this endeavour. My aim is to provide some background information from a geography and planning perspective, to reflect upon current means of service and policy, and to propose some ideas for future debates.(1)

As geographers and planners, we were actually dealing with Belval years before the move, for two reasons. Firstly, we have always had professional interest in Belval because it is a case of large-scale urban planning in a small country that has a huge impact on the built environment and, further, on the potential users of the site. Secondly, as members of the UL, we are all an integral part of this project, whether we want to be or not. Even now, years after the opening of the new Campus, we remain moving objects, now and on a daily basis. Thus, we as individuals must experiment with the promises and quandaries of mobility, actually a perfect indicator of the paradoxes of modern life.(2)

Recent events spurred extensive debates at the level of the UL, and this is another striking coincidence of different news items surfacing simultaneously, addressing a similar problem (see the last entry on Urbanization Unbound on real estate markets in Luxembourg). For some time now, we have known that the more the district is developed, the more parking  becomes a scarce, and thus expensive, resource across the whole site of Belval. This is an idea one could easily subscribe to and support in the name of sustainable development, if proper alternatives to the automobile were set in place. Yet, this is obviously not the case. So, we see an increasing number of commentaries and contributions made by members of the UL. A couple of Fridays ago, a colleague gave a perfect illustration of the problem based on his own travel itinerary and necessities. It was really an excellent insight into how complex, constrained, and costly the apparently simple travel from A to B can be. Others chimed in too, adding more convincing evidence of this, and confirming what we have actually known for a while.

Empirically evident are also the frequent breakdowns of the train system, the major transit connector to and from Belval and a second cause for concern. The last major incident happed on Monday, 4th June, in the late afternoon, when five (!) subsequent trains from Belval to the City where cancelled – without any (!) notice given to passengers, neither on site, nor on the App, nowhere. No replacement buses were organised. Passengers were simply left on the platform for the next train. However, the problem is more complex than simply being an issue of trains out of order. It deserves some explanation and context.(3) 

So… What’s the problem here?

Belval is/was envisioned as a highly acclaimed reconversion of a former brownfield site into a Science City. Since it is situated somehow isolated from the rest of the City of Esch-sur-Alzette (and the connectivity to Belvaux/Sanem only slowly improving), the question of how to provide good and sustainable access to the site was one of the key challenges raised very early on. With the installment of Gare Belval-Université – some of us may recall the pomp and circumstance when the Grand Duke opened the station – a supposedly convenient and sustainable solution had been found that would suit everyone and everything: It would be good for users, the urban setting, and the environment. Access to trains would even allow the mobility system to be based on a so-called modal split that devotes 40% of daily trips to public transit, and only 60% to the private automobile. It seemed like a revolution for the otherwise heavily car-oriented Luxembourg. 

However, a couple of issues were overlooked when the promise of sustainable mobility to and out of Belval was made. Some of these issues are systemic, so they are difficult to change. Simply speaking, every trip made by an individual from home to work represents a chain that has two ends: origin and destination. While Belval as a destination seems well accessible, one has to accept that the origin from which staff and students start their journey is widely dispersed across the country and the Greater Region. It would therefore take much more than the usual means of building fast and reliable service on major transport routes to make the site properly accessible. We would need more or less flexible feeder-services that complement the main lines, in order to keep travel times within a reasonable limit. And, we would need a good local setting for bikes, scooters, and pedestrians.

At the moment, none of that is sufficiently provided. Instead, we have a run-down train service, which has huge problems in ensuring the mere business as usual, not to speak of significant improvements. Feeder lines are rare or hardly adjusted to the new locale. Those that do exist (such as the 306-Bus from Trier to Belval) are often stuck in motorway traffic. Buses 202/203 from the city serve the steel mills, not the Campus – welcome to the post-industrial age. After Belvaux was turned to a major construction site this spring, local buses stopped serving the Campus, adding another 900m walk alongside crowded street traffic to our daily journey. Local conditions for cyclists, such as those coming from Esch or taking the long way from the Luxembourg City (yes, some of us indeed do this) are disappointing to say the least. And, this is the situation we are confronting three years after the move. As it stands now, we will have to wait for future concepts and fantasies to be developed, and meanwhile simply struggle with the daily business as usual.

Admittedly, this is also the result of a lack of service-orientation that runs through the whole train and transit system, which if was implemented would not necessarily make the trains run more efficiently per se, but would at least make daily trips less painful and adventurous. Just to give one more recent example: in response to complaints about the train incidence at Gare Belval-Université in early June, the CFL provided a lengthy technical explanation of what had happened and why this had caused turmoil. However, we still haven’t received any measured explanation concerning why passengers weren’t informed about the incident, and why no advice whatsoever was given concerning alternative routes.

Problems are also related to the mere fact that Luxembourg is suffering under its own economic and demographic success. For a small country, a development that has exhibited a constant annual growth rate of GDP (2.5-4 per cent) for over a decade brings an enormous strain on infrastructure systems. This implies a huge challenge to the whole country: to government, planners, transport providers, and of course, to customers. One could certainly argue that Luxembourg is rather active in future mobility policies. The problem is simply that what we currently observe is more or less the trying to catch up with the past, and not a planning for the future. There are at least 20-30 years of road building, combined with an entrenched car culture and systematic neglect of rail & bus all coded into the country’s DNA, which is hard to change in one sweep. In this regard, the future has not even started at all, except on paper. Expanding the infrastructure goes necessarily at the cost of present users, who have to accept delays and cancellations, at least in the next while. And, the idea of a more balanced spatial development that brings the places of work and residence closer together is also difficult to imagine because the housing market is not in any order of health and that is not likely to improve soon. Thus, recommending that cross-border and distance commuters settle in Luxembourg is not the same as offering a serious alternative.

Also, Luxembourg’s business model is ultimately geographical by nature. The small country is not only – and almost accidentally – surrounded by larger neighbours that provide the labour pool for its expanding economy, but its wealth generation is also something that was established over the past century on the foundations of a clever evolution and likewise management of external relations. Thus, the spatial imprint of the small country is much larger than its surface area of 2,500+ km2. The key commodity traded here is flows. These include flows of all kinds, such as money, politics, data, knowledge, goods, services, and labour. The present and future of the small state is almost entirely about circulation (and its regulation), which is probably also illustrated by the next big shot of economic development: space resources. The forgotten issue is that this massive volume of circulation is underpinned in physical space, in infrastructure systems and arteries that ensure the seamless flows of all the items mentioned above. Even though the flow of money through the financial marketplace seems increasingly virtual, the enabling systems for operating a top services and financial industry location are necessarily material: One needs educated staff, offices, accessibility etc. A small country that emerged as the second largest hub for investment funds on the planet essentially relies on 1st class systems of all kinds, and given the poor performance of transit that we bemoan, there clearly remains a lot of work to do. 

Those are a few notes on the general and historical background of the current state of affairs in a nutshell.

The problem behind the problems

It is clear that the dilemma we are facing is really difficult to resolve, and far from being a quick fix. Some of the structural and systemic factors mentioned above seem almost inconceivable to change, and if change is indeed possible, then probably only in the mid- or long-term. Geography is yet impossible to alter, particularly since it is part of Luxembourg’s political economy, a.k.a. business model. The focus on extracting value from flows, based on external relations of the small country with the rest of the world will most likely remain in place for the foreseeable future. The economy is destined to grow further, otherwise one would put the established level of wealth and income at risk. While the government’s emphasis is on expanding and improving the various infrastructures, it is also clear that: a) this takes time to implement; and b) given the foreseen growth of GDP and employment, it may suffice for absorbing additional demand, but not for solving existing problems. Belval is also specific in this respect, as: a) recent policy frameworks such as MoDu 2.0 or the Plan Sectoriel Transport do not devote particular attention to Belval, even though the site is actually the most important new generator of transport demand in the country; and b) the foreseen degree of density in the urban design of Belval will bring more and more people to the site, while accessibility won’t improve in the short term and parking capacities will be further reduced in due course. This makes the issue even more pressing.

In this context, one would wish that the actors and institutions in charge begin rethinking the problem and concentrating on intelligent investments, rather than initiating large road and rail works that need years to come to fruition. Long-term infrastructure improvements are, of course, a vital component of mobility policy and therefore necessary. This is the case with the possible high-speed tram extension to Belval. However, it is predicted that this will  not be completed until 2035 at the earliest.(4) Do we really want to wait more than fifteen years for a proper means of transport? This is rather unpalatable; therefore, in parallel, one ought to introduce some small changes that can make a big difference – organizational measures that allow certain effects to materialize in the immediate term. Unfortunately, the regular habits of infrastructure provision focus on large-scale construction plans in order to catch up with growth. And, they need time and capacity to be wisely planned, balanced (between different aims and alternatives) and openly communicated, rather than rigidly executed. Particularly, all these measures require an enormous degree of integration, which is questioned by the country’s setting of institutional fragmentation (fragmentation between state and communes, among the communes, between the different transport modes, and policy subjects…). A coherent body of policies that tackle the complex assemblage of mobility problems and their inter-related causes is urgently needed so that a significant impact is achieved relatively soon.

What should we do? A few steps towards a new direction

1 For Belval, a ‘quick response’ transport demand management strategy is urgently needed.(5) Accessing Belval is a huge challenge, which should no longer be treated with the business-as-usual attitude of long-term infrastructure policy that we’ve seen so far and which doesn’t help us now. Instead, the mobility issue should become part of a dedicated process of introducing short-term means and measures to improve the situation now. Consequently, we need a transport demand management (TDM) plan that scans the problems and systematically develops alternatives, particularly those that may have the biggest effect in the shortest period of time. This could include a beta-version of a rapid bus network (BNHS) to which the existing RGTR could be developed in due course. A comprehensive programme to improve the accessibility of Belval by bike is urgently needed as well. And, it would be helpful if there could be more time to adapt to planned changes in parking regulations as they have direct and significant consequences on labour and their needs and expenses.

2 In the context of the first point, the UL and the other institutions in Belval should jointly create an employer’s mobility scheme. While the state and related bodies can’t be released from their prime responsibility of providing the proper means of mobility into and out of Belval, employers can make a significant contribution to resolving this dilemma. They represent a sufficient critical mass of staff, so one could do more in terms of providing a good data basis and promoting alternative means such as car-pooling, car-sharing and the like. Such lengths are definitely worth the joint effort. In addition, one could also think about accompanying measures such as promoting teleworking, at least for some staff members. The university and government should push forward the possibilities of digitalization at least for those sorts of activities that can be done remotely, where physical presence on Campus is not essential. Certainly, each member of the University could also contribute on his and her own to improve the situation. Not all road trips are essential and necessary. Not all drivers are captive and thus without alternatives. Not all seats in vehicles are occupied, so why not promote a more efficient use of capacity? The bitter truth is that there is no constitutional right for free parking, and we simply have to accept this if the Campus is ever going to be sustainable.

3 The mode of planning and communication with the users of Belval on the one hand, and development and political responsibilities on the other hand, deserve improving, striving for a more inclusive approach than what has been practiced so far. Modern planning textbooks consistently emphasise transparency and participation, commitment and creativity. Yet in contrast to what is taught in the literature, the majority of small states (to put it this way) tend to execute plans and programmes in rather orthodox ways. While this country’s infrastructure policy adopted for good reason a multi-modal and no longer car-oriented approach, its implementation still follows the tradition of the powerful, authoritative state. The related first (government) and second (sectoral planning, development, construction) order institutions still stick to top-down planning and implementation, particularly when it comes to third parties and customers. However, planning, building and infrastructure provision are increasingly understood as learning processes, based on a mutual exchange of what the problem is, what possible solutions could be (there are always alternatives), and how a careful decision-making could be organised. Don't we want to go there as well? Or, would we prefer the old fashion of the “godfather” planning ideal (Walter Siebel)?

4 There is one more reason why policy measures should be balanced more carefully: There is an issue concerning social equality when the cost of commuting is raised as a topic that effects everyone in similar ways. Losing 1,000 €/year for parking impacts each captive person differently because of wage differentials and the complexity of his/her family circumstances. Obviously, supporting an exogenous change is much easier for let’s say a male Luxembourgian professor who inherited a comfortable house close to Luxembourg city centre, than for a foreign female support staff, renting an apartment in a small town in Belgium, France or Germany. Deciding to work in Belval is the result of a complex trade-off between housing costs, transport costs, and travel time. Related decisions concerning where to live and where to work are made in long term. In turn, it is very complex to alter: relocating may mean the changing of schools, lower proximity to family networks, more stretched commuting for the partner, etc. Changing jobs may actually be easier.

So, the result of non-negotiable and socially undifferentiated policy may actually cause a much greater turnover of some particular staff, typically support female support staff with kids and less flexible hours. And, obviously frontaliers are hit the hardest, when one considers who is primarily affected and what their average salary is. As a consequence, it is difficult to imagine any transport management plan or parking scheme that is socially blind.(6) Given the sometimes rigid and inflexible ways a policy scheme is implemented (such as the 60:40 modal split) demonstrates the lack of understanding – and power playing – by particular (Luxembourgian?) elites vis-a-vis other workers, who are typically cross-border, often female, and with kids. Overall, a positive step forward would actually be to add some granularity in the policy, typically a fare system that recognizes the availability of public transport at residence, the category of staff, and their family status.

5 What could institutions such as the UL do by themselves in order to tackle the problem? There is certainly a need for education and creating expertise in mobility management at the level of larger enterprises and institutions. Apart from some notable exceptions (among them the UL), there is little knowledge in the country concerning company mobility management, except for perhaps the expertise in providing XXL-parking lots that cater to SUVs in underground garages... Corporate policy could become a fundamental element of TDM solutions as discussed above. There is also an urgent need to collect data about demand (scatter and door-to-door trips) as well as supply (reliability, punctuality).  Instead of collecting single experiences, it is important to show the global picture. In past years, data was in fact collected through surveys. These should now be repeated in order to analyze how the users have responded to the palate of transport offers and resources. Setting up a mobility plan would be a first step, but it won’t be trivial. As members of the UL experienced in developing the transport policy plan at the University, we know that this comes with many challenges, and that it requires developing alternatives and what-if scenarios.

To sum up: 

While the actual debate about parking seems to have gained momentum only recently, the issue of how to best plan proper access to Belval is not new. Indeed, this note was inspired by comments made by individuals at the UL concerning the current malaise: Listening to single voices is clearly important (!), as it provides an empirically grounded view of the problem at stake. However, individual responses do not signal the ultimate solution, as politics need to consider the public good. In this context, two peculiar issues in the country’s policy and planning traditions must be reflected on, addressed, and overcome: Firstly, the tradition of asking the government (or the mayor …) to take care of particular issues that result from very special interests (Partikularinteressen) needs to stop. This goes usually at the cost of more coherent overall strategies and the common good. Secondly, there is a tradition in Luxembourg of sticking to large-scale urban projects, which are costly, risky, hard to integrate and often subject to delays. While real-life implementation of small but useful steps in the right direction is challenging in the details (and less glossy and therefore harder to sell to the public), policy makers are tempted to go for the big thing, the polished technical solution. This is also the case in Belval: Options such as rail, super-bus, or now fast-tram were already promised and calculated, and the former two have already been rejected. Should we now wait for another 15-20 years of large-scale infrastructure planning to materialize, while we already know how difficult the planning and political process can be in a small country? We need an open and constructive debate with all parties involved on how to improve the situation now, as soon as possible, not in two decades.

Markus Hesse

Index

(1) Many thanks to Geoffrey, Francesco and Katja for reading, commenting and providing inspiration, and also – as always – to Connie for editing. The responsibility for this remains of course solely mine.

(2) Sheller, M. & J. Urry (2016). Mobilizing the new mobilities paradigm. Applied Mobilities 1(1), 10-25.

(3) This note focuses on the core of the transport problem, while layers such as social cohesion, identity and the like remain excluded.

(4) These days Minister Bausch presented a high-speed tram from Luxembourg City to Belval to be built by 2035. Such news is good for providing headlines, but won’t provide relief now. Given the increasing frequency of press releases on tram extension in the capital city and beyond, one must have the impression that the tram is becoming primarily a political vehicle, rather than an effective means of resolving pressing problems.

(5) See for example: Black, C. & E. Schreffler (2010). Understanding transport demand management and its role in delivery of sustainable urban transport. Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board (2163), 81-88.

(6) There are manifold societal and equity dimensions inherent to mobility and transport, which call for a more than technical treatment of this subject matter; see e.g. Lucas, K. (2012). Transport and social exclusion: Where are we now? Transport policy 20, 105-113.